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Introduction
Risk regulation in the European Union (EU) over the last two decades could be seen as a process of relentless soul-searching with regard to the normatively desirable and functionally adequate model of taking collective decisions in the face of technological progress, scientific uncertainty, and societal contestation. In the wake of the BSE crisis at the turn of the century the EU has undergone major legal and constitutional developments in this field 1 including the promotion of the precautionary principle 2 to a general principle of EU law applicable to all policy fields touching upon environmental, health, animal or plant health protection. 3 These developments seem to reflect the recognition that while scientific expertise plays a crucial role in democratic decision-making on risk, its potential to legitimate such decision-making is limited. 4 In the well-known Pfizer ruling the EU general court has expressed this idea by pronouncing that the exercise of public authority by the EU executive is rendered legitimate by way of its political responsibility as well accountability towards democratically established institutions, such as the European Parliament. Scientific experts on the other hand, 'although they have scientific legitimacy, have neither democratic legitimacy nor political responsibilities. Scientific legitimacy is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of public authority.' 5 In this way the general court was careful to preserve a space for the exercise of political discretion bound by law in the face of scientific uncertainty, finding that the Commission was not bound by the scientific opinion of its expert committee when banning the use of a certain antibiotic in animal feed. 6 So far so good. The considerable policy, legal and scholarly efforts seem to indicate a change of approach in EU risk regulation from a technocratic to inclusive and precautionary governance, and from a naïve positivist understanding of science as infallible authority to a more nuanced view of its contextualized, value-laden and uncertain nature as shown by years of social studies of science, risk and technology. 7 The politics of EU risk regulation are now well understood. Or are they?
Those following the topic know, of course, that the EU's search for the 'right' model of risk regulation has been accompanied by an inner struggle, and many contradictions both in legal norms and regulatory practices. 8 Perhaps the biggest paradox is that despite the widespread acknowledgement of the limitations of science as the basis for public decision-making, EU decision-makers continue to justify regulatory decisions on risk and technology almost exclusively in scientific terms. 9 This paper helps unpacking this paradox by placing the discussion about the role of science in EU risk regulation within the institutional context of the EU public 5 Case T-13/99 (n 4) para. 201. 6 On the continuing relevance of Pfizer see Christopher Anderson, 'Contrasting Models of EU Administration in Judicial Review of Risk Regulation ' (2014) 9 It is undisputed here that scientific expertise is a crucial part of risk regulation. However, the uncertain nature of many late-modern technological risks necessarily changes the role of science in regulation, see ibid and above (n 8).
administration and EU administrative law. It is within this context that a vast number of risk decisions in the EU are being made, which in turn shapes the way in which scientific expertise is being used in these decisions.
By doing so, the paper follows the insight that controversies surrounding risk regulation are at their core controversies about the legitimacy of an unelected public administration within modern liberal democracies 10 including about ideas of how law could legitimate the exercise of wide discretionary powers. This concern is particularly pertinent to the EU public administration the institutional complexity of which sets it apart from political-administrative orders both at national and international levels. 11 Moreover, the expansion of the EU administrative state intensifies the concern for administrative legitimation 12 in an institutional context strongly reliant on expertise yet relatively remote from national democratic processes. This paper, therefore, explores the legitimacy challenge posed by the emergence of the EU 'risk administration' -a public administration whose main task is to assess, manage and communicate risks on the basis of available, and often limited, scientific evidence. EU law plays a vital role in addressing that challenge. On the one hand, it is a mechanism of constituting, limiting and holding the EU public administration to account thereby ensuring its formal legitimation. On the other hand, EU law itself 'provides both arenas and discourses for disputing the role and nature of public administration. ' 13 This paper explores the co-production of law, 14 administrative legitimation and scientific expertise in a particular field of the EU risk administration, namely in the case of EU market authorizations of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Based on an in-depth empirical study of two particularly controversial authorization processes, it shows that that the practice of administrative implementation of EU rules on GMOs as well as of judicial review thereof is characterized by competing views on how the EU public administration ought to be legitimated in the face of 10 Elizabeth Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart 2007); Anderson (n 7). 11 See special issue AseGornitzka and Cathrine Holst (eds), The role of expert knowledge in EU executive institutions, (2016) 1 Politics and Governance. 12 We use the term legitimation instead of legitimacy to distance ourselves from a sociological understanding of legitimacy as actual social acceptance of the exercise of public authority. Legitimation instead refers to mechanisms of legitimation, which justify the exercise of public authority leading to the assumption that it is acceptable. 13 See Fisher (n 11) 23. 14 See Introduction to this volume. scientific uncertainty and contestation, which in turn influences ideas about the role of scientific expertise in this process.
Shifting sands -administrative legitimation between control and deliberation
EU regulation of GMOs illustrates well the struggle over the appropriate balance between science and politics of EU administrative decision-making as well as the role of EU law in that struggle. Since over a decade the administrative implementation of EU rules on the marketing of GMOs is the arena in which the political battle over this controversial technology has taken place. The resulting problems of regulatory deadlock, failure of deliberation and controversial legal reform have been substantively discussed. 15 In this paper we aim to show that the struggle over GMO authorizations has also been a struggle over ideas of what constitutes a legitimate EU risk administration.
Models of public administration are reflections of constitutional theory. 16 Our understandings of administrative legitimation are thus infused with constitutional theories regarding the legitimacy of public administration within constitutional democracies. These understandings are therefore shaped within, to use Elizabeth Fisher's term, discourses of administrative constitutionalism, which manifest themselves, among others, in legal and administrative decision-making. 17 Naturally, concepts of administrative legitimation will vary from one legal system to another. 18 Yet also within one legal system, the contours of such concepts are essentially contested, in flux, and subject to an on-going constitutional re-settlement. 19 In other words, normative ideals about public administration and how it should be constituted, limited, and held to account so as to ensure its legitimacy are constantly competing with one another within administrative legal practice. In turn, those ideals and discourses shape the process of technological risk evaluation in different ways.
Contestations with regard to administrative legitimation are also (and perhaps even more so) 20 present in the EU legal system, and are particularly visible in the field of EU risk regulation. For the purposes of this paper, we identify two ideal models of EU administrative legitimation, namely the control model and the deliberative model.
A key difference between these models is the way they define the role of public administration, including the nature of administrative discretion. Moreover, each model conceptualizes the nature of safety, risk, scientific evidence and uncertainty differently. The control model follows principal-agent or "transmission belt" theories of the administrative state. 21 Applied to the EU, the control model sees the EU public administration as the agentof the EU legislature as its democratically legitimated principal. Wide discretionary powers are seen as problematic, and need to be limited and controlled in order to maintain the democratic transmission between EU legislative commands and their administrative implementation. EU administrative law then is seen as the main instrument to control administrative power, and to protect individual liberties from arbitrary actions via stringent judicial control. 22 In the field of risk regulation, scientific expertise contributes to that control. By rationalizing administrative decision-making, it becomes an ex-ante control mechanism that facilitates ex-post judicial review. Therefore, the scientific advice of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) into the Commission authorization process on GMOs (see below at 2) is seen as instrumental to delivering the facts, which the Commission can apply to the legislative commands in this field. Because of its control function scientific advice constitutes the main input into the authorization process leaving the Commission with little political discretion. In contrast, the deliberative model sees public administration as a relatively autonomous institution serving the public good. Instead of emphasising judicial control, it emphasises the value of deliberation in administrative decision-making. 24 According to this model the Commission, comitology and the EFSA are all part of a composite EU administration, 25 which legitimizes its action on the basis of the cooperative and deliberative nature of its joint decision-making. 26 The Commission is granted substantive discretion to achieve broadly formulated legislative goals and objectives in cooperation with other actors, which includes the right to deviate from EFSA opinions as well as to base decisions on so-called other legitimate factors, such as socio-economic and ethical concerns. The exercise of that discretion is legitimated on the basis of the deliberative nature of Commission decision-making, which is supported by reason-giving requirements. The role of EFSA is to inform this process.
However, both the limits and value-laden nature of scientific risk assessment are recognized, and the role of EFSA is framed as one of communicating openly about these limits including knowledge gaps and scientific uncertainties. Complexity and uncertainty are recognized as pervasive granting the Commission a wide range of discretion to make policy judgements on the basis of available scientific evidence. In this way EFSA's advice is seen as only one input into the process. In this model, knowledge is seen as an unstable body of contested truth claims. 27 Finally, the role of the EU Courts is, while acknowledging substantive discretion on the part of the It should be noted that neither of the above models of administrative legitimation provide for a fully satisfactory answer to the challenges of contemporary risk administration. The control model relies on legal formalism, and tries to preserve the traditional idea of rule of law in the liberal constitutional state including the idea of democratic control and accountability of public administration. Yet it does so at the risk of becoming a fiction, and of not being able to normatively capture the actual complexity of the exercise of administrative power, especially in a multi-level supranational system. Already in 1975 the US scholar Richard Stewart observed the 'disintegration of the traditional model, which has proven unsuccessful in its effort to reconcile the discretionary power enjoyed by agencies with the basic premise of the liberal state that the only legitimate intrusions into private liberty and property interests are those consented to through legislative processes.' 29 It can be assumed that this problem intensified over the last decades marked by increased global interdependence, stronger regional integration and the subsequent transfer of executive powers beyond the state. In contrast to the control model, the deliberative model promises a more realistic and pragmatic approach to administrative problem solving guided by the general public interest. However, it could be criticized as problematic for sacrificing legal certainty, overestimating the potential of deliberation in democratic problem-solving, and giving raise to concerns over the arbitrary use of discretionary power. 30 Moreover, rather than being a fully fledged model at present it rather serves as a container notion for a series of alternative visions of public administration which are still lacking conceptual The two models therefore should be understood as contrast points the tension between which fosters a productive search for an adequate concept of administrative legitimation, in this case in the EU. Looking through this lens at concrete examples of the EU administrative legal practice helps ascertaining the suitability of one or the other model in a particular context, as well as crystalizing instances of gradual legal and administrative change that is already taking place. What is of interest here is to observe the process whereby the challenges of the techno-scientific progress are transforming ideas and concepts of administrative legitimation including concepts of administrative law. It therefore should be seen as part of the EU's on-going process of soul searching and contestation over the 'right' model of risk regulation.
In the remainder of this paper we use these two models in order to analyze two controversial cases of EU authorization of GMOs. The goal is to trace back discourses about EU administrative legitimation, and to analyse the way in which they shape the practice of GMO decision-making including the role of scientific expertise therein.
Administrative legitimation and GMO authorizations: the long tale of Herculex and Amflora
In the last years, two processes of EU authorization of GMOs have been particularly controversial, and hence emblematic of the regulatory crisis in this field more generally. The first case concerns the GM Maize 1507, branded as Herculex; and the second the GM potato EH92-527-1 branded as Amflora. 32 Both concern applications for cultivation, i.e. for the agricultural use of GMOs, which has been particularly controversial because of its potential environmental and socio-economic implications. 33 Moreover, both cases involved a long and complicated authorization process marked by persistent contestation of both the EFSA's risk assessment and the Commission's risk management; several EFSA opinions as a result of recurrent requests by the Commission; and administrative delay. Moreover, in both cases the EU General Court has (for the first time in the field of GMO regulation) reviewed the legality of the Commission's administrative action.
Previous research suggested that EFSA on GMOs 'generally indicate no uncertainty' that might trigger extra risk management measures, and that EFSA has'framed 32 Our analysis is based on document review and individual semi-structured interviews. 33 Lee, Maria (n 16); Lee (n 9); Weimer (n 5).
scientific uncertainties in such a way that it can be resolved by extra information, or can be readily managed, or deemed irrelevant to any risk.' 34 Therefore, EFSA's risk assessment has been described as 'uncertainty intolerant,' which means that it is reluctant to both acknowledge and communicate scientific uncertainty, instead of genuinely and systematically investigating it. 35 The Commission, on the other hand, was found to merely rubberstamp EFSA's opinions acting 'as a blind driver taking directions from the passenger in the back seat,' 36 thereby inheriting EFSA's uncertainty intolerance.
Our analysis of decision-making in both cases (see table) offers new findings in this respect. We register a slight yet meaningful gradual change in the way both EFSA and the Commission have acted within the authorization process, notably with regard to how they as EU administrative bodies dealt with scientific advice, risk and uncertainty.The following two sections present our findings in more detail. 
The EFSA as expert agency: from control to deliberation
Our empirical analysis reveals a gradual change in approach in recent years on the part of the EFSA GMO panel 39 expressed in its willingness to both acknowledge and communicate knowledge gaps, flaws in methodology, potential risks and remaining scientific uncertainty. We find that this shift has been the result of external pressure from several Member States, other scientific authorities as well as recurrent requests of the Commission. 42 The latter is an insect-resistant genetically modified maize characterised by the insertion of two genetic constructs: one which produces Cry1F,a so-called Btprotein 43 that makes the maize resistant to certain Lepidoptera, 44 and another which makes the maize tolerant to glufosinate ammonium, a herbicide the use of which shall be phased out in the EU by 2017. 45 Herculex has raised concerns with regard to the risk of resistance development in target organisms, as well as the uncertain impact of the Bt-toxin on non-target organisms. In its initial risk assessments the EFSA did not seriously engage with these concerns. Likely being aware of the political pressure to provide authoritative scientific advice as the new EU expert agency,at the time it framed its advice in definite terms following the 'uncertainty intolerant' pattern previously identified by Van EFSA to review its previous opinion in the light of eleven independent scientific studies, 54 which explored the effects and potential toxicity of Cry1Ab on some target and non-target organisms. However, the GMO panel only vaguely engaged with these studies dismissing all of them as not providing new scientific evidence. 55 Most notably, EFSA remained of the opinion that the two proteins (Cry1F and Cry1AB) had high affinities and that their concentration in pollen was relatively low continuing to rely on existing studies of Cry1Ab for the assessment of Herculex. 56 However, in 2010 the Commission yet again asked EFSA for an update on the basis of a new scientific study conducted by a non-profit research institute. 57 The latter Hence, EFSA barely engaged with the contesting scientific views expressed by the WHO and EMEA. It defined its response in a decisive and clear-cut way ('will not be compromised'), and evaded the uncertainty surrounding the use of nptII by employing terms, which create the appearance of certainty and low risk ('extremely low probability' and 'very unlikely'). 70 Ibid., at 3, "There are limitations related among others to sampling, detection, challenges in estimating exposure levels and the inability to assign transferable resistance genes to a defined source"; see also at 67-82. these two antibiotic resistance genes from GM plants to bacteria, associated with the use of GM plants, are unlikely". Importantly, for the first time since the establishment of EFSA, two scientists (of the BIOHAZ Panel) disagreed with the majority opinion and raised objections to the assessment of the likelihood of horizontal gene transfer and its potential implications for the medical use of kanamycin and neomycin. The minority opinion found that "it would be imprudent to regard resistance to any antibiotic as being of little or no relevance to human health" 71 (emphasis added); and that the level of risk for human health and the environment could not be assessed, as the probabilities of horizontal gene transfer were below the detection limits. Hence, the minority opinion openly acknowledged that a risk assessment was not possible under the given circumstances.
Risk assessment of Herculex
The EFSA consolidated opinion, however, dismissed these arguments without further explanation by simply stating that it had taken into due account the minority opinion and that 'from a scientific point of view, the joint opinion of 2009 did not require further clarification or additional work of a scientific nature.' 72 We observe, therefore, that the pressure exerted on EFSA by national authorities, independent scientific studies and other agencies, as well as the Commission's recurrent requests had forced the agency to engage more seriously with competing views and scientific uncertainty. This resulted in a more nuanced risk assessment combined with more explicit communication of uncertainty information. However, this opening up in EFSA's opinions ultimately did not result in a modification of the overall conclusions regarding the risks of both GMOs. This reveals that EFSA understood uncertainty as something negligible for the overall risk assessment, because it was assumed that uncertainty is not pervasive, but can be reduced through risk management. Moreover, EFSA's tendency to conclude the risk assessment witha definitive and certain responseindicates an understanding of its role as risk assessor in line with the control model. EFSA sees itself as instrumental for the provision of facts, to which the Commission can apply legislative commands. 71 See above (n 70) at p. 81. 72 As explained in Case T-240/10, Hungary v European Commission, see below (n 94) at para 39:
"On 28 April 2009, the Director of EFSA asked the chairmen of the GMO and BIOHAZ panels and the chairman of the joint working group whether the two dissenting opinions required further work of a scientific nature. On 25 May 2009, those chairmen replied that, during the preparation of the joint opinion of 2009, the content of the two dissenting opinions had largely been taken into account, so that, from a scientific point of view, the joint opinion of 2009 did not require further clarification or additional work of a scientific nature".
The role of EFSA therefore is not merely to facilitate the exercise of administrative discretion by the Commission, but to bea decisive basis for it thereby controlling discretion.
The Commission as risk manager: from deliberation to control
The conduct of the Commission in both the Herculexand Amfloracases follows a similar pattern. The cross-analysis of both cases demonstrates the ambiguous role of the Commission in its attempt to overcome the exacerbation of scientific, regulatory and political conflicts in this area, and to maintain its own legitimacy as the EU public administration. While EFSA gradually shifted from an uncertainty intolerant to a more uncertainty tolerant approach in both authorizations, the opposite holds true for the Commission.
Initially, in both cases the Commission had operated in a rather cautious and politically sensible way arguably at the expense of an efficient and timely administrative process. It engaged with different scientific authorities encouraging their collaboration with the EFSA. It repeatedly put pressure on EFSA to respond to competing scientific views expressed either by national authorities or independent studies. Therefore, the Commission could be seen as having acted as an administrative body with substantive discretion whose task it is to foster a deliberative process, which should inform the final authorization decision on a scientifically complex and politically sensitive application. Likely aware of the resistance on the part of the Member States that it might encounter in comitology, the Commission tried to accommodate different concerns in a pre-emptive manner. It thereby acted in a manner indicative of the deliberative model.
In the Herculex case, its self-understanding as a body with wide disretion is evidenced by the fact that for the first time in the field of GMOs (as far as we know) the Commission attempted to depart from EFSA's advice, and to refuse authorisation for Herculex. In 2007, former Commissioner Stavros Dimas presented a draft decision proposing not to approve the maize for cultivation on the basis of the high degree of scientific uncertainty and the lack of scientific knowledge over significant traits of this GMO. The draft proposal stressed the need for an approach based on the precautionary principle, and indicated that the degree of uncertainty was so high that it was 'not possible to establish appropriate management measures which would effectively mitigate the potential damage on the environment '. 73 However, instead of pursuing this proposal in comitology, the Commission again returned to EFSA. After the agency re-affirmed its previous findings about the safety The document reported a number of objections raised by MSs concerning the impact on soil organisms and anthropods, the long-term effects of the Bt toxin on the environment, and it also pointed out that, ex lege, environmental risk assessments need to consider potential effects on non-target organisms and cumulative long-term effects which, at that time, were not adequately evaluated. Importantly, the Commission seemed to question the reliability of a meta-review of the applicant's assessment, marking the lack of crucial data such as the concentration of Bt toxin, and contesting the methodology used by EFSA in its assessment. See EU Commission (2007) Both processes of authorisation were marked by delay, inaction, and, ultimately, rulings of the EU general court. 76 As usual for GMO authorisations, 77 the comitology process failed to producethe necessary majority, which meant that, under the rules applicable at that time, the Commission had to forward the draft authorization proposals to the Council. However, in the Herculex case, it was not until November We conclude that EFSA's shift towards a more uncertainty-tolerant deliberative approach was ultimately not followed by the Commission, but was, instead, met with a strikingly uncertainty intolerant response along the lines of the control model.
We argue that an important factor influencing the Commission has been that it interpreted its mandate to implement GMO legislation along the lines of the control model: as being restraint by the EFSA majority opinion. For example, in its press release on the authorization of Herculex, the Commission has explained its proposal with the obligation to comply with the ruling of the EU general court and thereby with the rule of law. 84 This is astonishing at least in the sense that the Court found the Commission guilty of failure to act, but did not impose on the Commission how to act in this case. Therefore, it seems that the Court's ruling did not prevent the Commission from adopting a different proposal, for example, rejecting the authorization. It shows, however, that when it comes to taking the finaldecision the Commission does not see itself as a body with substantive discretion able to make a 82 At the time of writing no decision on Maize 1507 was yet adopted. policy judgment on the basis of scientific information, if it means deviating from its expert agency.
Judicial responses
In both (the Herculex and the Amflora) cases, the EU general court (hereinafter the Court) had for the first time the opportunity to scrutinize the administrative process of GMO authorisations, thereby acting in its function as an administrative court. In doing so, it revealed an understanding of administrative legitimation of the Commission along the lines of the deliberative model. While granting the Commission a wide discretion to make factual assessments on the basis of the EFSA opinions, the Court stressed the importance of the requirement to act consistently and to provide reasons on the part of the Commission. However, the legal nature and significance of both judgments are rather different.
In the Herculex case, the Court ruled on an action for the Commission's failure to act brought by Pioneer. 85 Under the comitology rules applicable at the time, the Commission was obliged to submit its draft decision on Herculexto the Council 'without delay.' 86 However, the Commission did not proceed with this step. It was not disputed among the parties that the Commission exceeded the time period for forwarding its draft decision to the Council as laid down in the relevant rules. The question was whether this delay could be justified.
What is interesting about this case is the Commission's defence strategy before the Court.It framed its role in the authorization procedure heavily in terms of the deliberative model asserting that when deciding on when, and if at all, to proceed with the Council stage of the comitology procedure it must be granted a wide discretion to consider a variety of factors. Making a reference to the Pharos authorization was based on a risk assessment that was 'deficient, inconsistent, and incomplete,' which amounted to a breach of the Commission's obligations under Directive 2001/18, 92 namely to follow the principles of environmental risk assessment laid down therein, and to take into particular consideration GMOs, such as Amflora, which contain antibiotic resistant marker genes. The plaintiff therefore asked the Court for a substantive review of the Commission decision including of the quality of its factual basis. 93 The Court, however, did not rule on these claims, but chose a procedural detour around them instead. It raised, of its own motion, a new potential ground for annulment, namely the infringement of essential procedural requirements. 94 The Court ruled that the Commission breached a procedural rule governing the adoption of the authorization decision, namely the obligation to re-submit its draft decision on Amflora to the competent comitology committee following the 2009 consolidated EFSA opinion.
As explained above, the Commission, before adopting the final decision, did not resubmit to the comitology committee the amended draft of this decision, together with the consolidated EFSA opinion and the dissenting opinion, which would have effectively restarted the comitology process. Instead, the Commission following the Council's failure to adopt a decision on the initial draft went on to authorize the product. In its defense, the Commission argued that it was not necessary to resubmit the proposal, because its enacting terms were identical to the initial draft, which had already been discussed in the committee. Moreover, the new proposal contained no ', 'limitations', 'uncertainties', 'unlikely') The Court took the Commission by the word. It was rigorous in showing that it was contradictory of the Commission to argue that the EFSA consolidated opinion was merely a confirmation of previous EFSA opinions, and not significant enough to alter substantively the scientific basis on which the final Amflora authorization was based.
And, en passant, the Court also proved to be quite sensitive to the pervasive scientific complexity of the authorization process.
Read along the lines of the deliberative model of administrative legitimation the Court's reasoning indicates that the EU public administration, understood as a composite and cooperative institution, has a relatively wide substantive discretion in deciding on GMO authorizations. In exercising this discretion it must get the procedure right, cooperate, avoid contradictions, and provide for a sound and consistent reasoning of its actions. In contrast, nothing in this judgment points to an understanding of the role of the Commission along the line of the control model as being obliged to follow the EFSA's final recommendation, to disregard the uncertainties communicated by EFSA as irrelevant, and as not having the discretion to take into account dissenting opinions.
Conclusions
This paper has argued that key notions of EU risk regulation, such as science, risk, uncertainty, risk assessment and risk management are significantly shaped in the legal administrative discourse through which EU risk regulation takes place. It has analyzed EU administrative and judicial decision making in the case of two highly controversial GMO authorizations tracing how notions of administrative legitimation (i.e. ideas of how the EU public administration is constituted, controlled and held to account) have co-produced notions of GMO risks as well as understandings of the role of scientific experts in administrative decision-making on risk.
The findings indicate that different models of administrative legitimation, namely the control model and the deliberative model, are competing with each other in EU legal administrative practice (see above at 1.) Moreover, different actors (EU agency, Commission, courts) can embrace different notions depending on the stage of the administrative process (risk assessment or risk management) and the level of contestation and pressure from other actors (e.g. national scientific authorities, NGOs, or courts).
In the GMO cases analyzed the EU expert agency EFSA has initially understood its role mainly in terms of the control model, namely as being instrumental in enabling decision-making by the Commission by providing the latter with ascertained facts about quantifiable risks. It therefore framed its risk assessments in an uncertainty intolerant way, and tried to establish scientific authority vis-à-vis other scientific sources. However, over time EFSA has responded to pressure and contestation coming from national authorities and NGOs by gradually moving towards the deliberative model. This resulted in more nuanced risk assessment communicating scientific uncertainty more openly, and in one case including a dissenting opinion.
The Commission, in contrast, has shifted in the opposite direction. During the phase of risk assessment (which took many years in both cases investigated) the Commission assumed the role of facilitating deliberation among different actors and using its discretion to delay the process in order to enable all actors to voice their concerns. Interestingly, it interpreted the precautionary principle as justifying delay.
In contrast, the closer the Commission approached the final decision, the more it followed the control model. The Commission attributed a major role to EFSA in determining the outcome of the authorization procedure. EFSA's majority opinion was seen as a constraint on the Commission's exercise of discretion not leaving space to consider instances of scientific uncertainty or dissenting opinion. Moreover, when adopting the final decision the Commission did not see itself as entitled to invoke the precautionary principle. Thus, the final decision was justified mainly in (majority) scientific terms leaving barely any space for the exercise of policy judgment on the part of the Commission. And for that purpose, scientific expertise was construed as being able to provide sufficient facts and certainty about GMO risks. This shows that the Commission regarded scientific expertise as a surrogate for legislative control in the control model. Given the wide framework character of EU legislative provisions, the fiction of an objective and prescriptive law in the control model has been replaced with the fiction of an objective expert that is able to tame administrative discretion.
Interestingly, the Commission's preference for the control model cannot be explained by judicial approaches to administrative legitimation. The rulings of the EU General Court analysed in this paper reveal the continuing relevance of Pfizer and the deliberative model expressed therein. In other words, the Court grants the Commission a wide discretion in ascertaining the factual basis for risk decisions while imposing procedural requirements of reason giving, consistency, and compliance with all legally prescribed procedures. While shying away from directly reviewing the quality of EFSA's risk assessments, in the Amflora case the Court was nonetheless able, along the lines of the deliberative model, to hold the Commission to account by emphasizing the cooperative nature of the EU public administration as well as process values such as reason-giving and consistency. This paper, therefore, revealed an interesting discrepancy between the Commission's and the Courts' approach to administrative legitimation, which should be subject to further research. From the perspective of the EU courts, the Commission's exercise of discretion is legitimated in terms of the deliberative model: as risk manager the latter has the responsibility, in a scientifically informed way, to exercise a political judgment.
The Commission, however, according to the control model, sees its discretionary space radically reduced to following the lead of its expert agency. In a highly politicized and contested field of EU risk regulation the Commission sees scientific expertise as the main, if not the only way of justifying its decisions. It does, in other words, not exercise political judgment when it comes to GMO authorizations other than to delay the process, and not to decide. It follows that the Pfizer Court'semphasis of political legitimacy together with the recognition of the limits of scientific legitimacy is not meaningful in practice. To put provocatively, the Court constructs political legitimacy of the EU administration without questioning the reality of that legitimacy. 110 This raises questions with regard to the viability of the deliberative model indicating that the search for the adequate model of administrative legitimation of the EU public administration is far from being over.
